The internal resolution of serious ethnic and national conflicts almost inevitably involves some form of power sharing and/or power division (autonomy and federation). While power sharing is often invoked in normative and comparative accounts of conflict resolution, it is less frequently systematically examined. Conflict and Institutional Design (CID) is a comparative analysis of the making, maintenance and too often breaking of power sharing agreements. When and how are peace agreements negotiated? Does UN peacekeeping make a positive difference? What role than transitional justice mechanisms perform? Do they help? What type of power-sharing and federal designs are available? Under what conditions is power sharing likely to help contain conflict, and when does it fail? The course will pay particular attention to what happens after a power-sharing agreement is reached. The institutional focus will include analysis of electoral system design for divided societies, the dynamics of electoral and party competition within ethnic segmentation and consociational governance (power-sharing constitutions, executives, legislatures and federations). Why do some power-sharing regimes succeed while others fail?